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Introduction
Recent academic literature has seen a rise of studies investigating the effect of individual investor sentiment on stock returns. Several papers document a strong link between the two variables both in the time-series and cross-sectionally. These papers estimate predictive regressions of the form t 1 t t r s e n t i m e n t + = α +β ⋅ + η
where r t+1 is the return of the aggregate stock market or a (zero-cost) portfolio at time t+1 and sentiment t is a proxy for (lagged) investor sentiment. A common finding for the US stock market is a statistically and economically significant negative coefficient estimate for β.
Therefore, periods of higher investor optimism tend to be followed by significantly lower returns for the aggregate market (e.g. Brown and Cliff, 2005) and even more pronouncedly for firms that are hard to price and thus difficult to arbitrage (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2006, Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006) .
Earlier evidence on the effects of sentiment almost exclusively focuses on crosssectional results for the U.S. stock market, e.g. for value versus growth stocks or small versus large stocks. Extending this earlier evidence, we analyze the effects of investor sentiment on international aggregate stock markets. An analysis of this sort seems interesting for several reasons.
First, stock markets at the aggregate country level are clearly both hard to value and hard to arbitrage. This follows from the fact that macro data is notoriously noisy and since it is difficult to hedge away idiosyncratic shocks at the country level. Therefore, it seems reasonable that sentiment shocks affect stock markets on aggregate and not just different subgroups of stocks.
1 Second, taking an international perspective allows us to test new hypotheses relating to the effects of sentiment on returns. In this paper, we will test whether sentiment effects are especially pronounced in countries with low institutional development (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998) or in countries which are especially prone to herd-like behavior and overreaction (Chui, Titman and Wei, 2008) .
Finally, using international stock return data provides a natural out-of-sample test for earlier U.S. findings (see e.g. Griffin, Ji, Martin (2003) or Ang et al. (2008) on the importance of testing market anomalies out-of-sample) and pooling data across countries increases the power of tests which yields more reliable estimates (see e.g. Ang and Bekaert (2007) for a discussion of this issue).
Therefore, we investigate whether consumer confidence -as a proxy for individual investor sentiment -affects stock returns along the lines of (1) in 18 countries around the globe. We find, first, that there is a significant impact of investor sentiment on aggregate stock returns across countries on average. This effect remains significant even after controlling for other standard risk factors and expected business conditions. Secondly, in cross-sectional regressions we provide some first evidence that the impact of sentiment on stock returns is stronger in countries that have less market integrity and in countries that are culturally more prone to herd-like behavior as predicted by Chui, Titman and Wei (2008) .
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section selectively reviews the existing literature and derives testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides estimates of predictive regressions of returns on sentiment similar to equation (1). Finally, section 5 investigates cross-country results and section 6 concludes.
Earlier Literature and Testable Hypotheses
The general finding of a sentiment-return relation is at odds with standard finance theory which predicts that stock prices reflect the discounted value of expected cash-flows and that irrationalities among market participants are erased by arbitrageurs. Sentiment does not play any role in this classic framework. Instead, the behavioral approach suggests that waves of irrational sentiment, i.e. times of overly optimistic or pessimistic expectations, can persist and affect asset prices for significant periods of time.
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Baker and Wurgler (2006) point out that sentiment-based mispricing is based on both an uninformed demand shock and a limit to arbitrage. Regarding the first ingredient, uninformed demand shocks, Brown and Cliff (2005) argue that sentiment is most likely a very persistent effect so that demand shocks of uninformed noise traders may be correlated over time to give rise to strong and persistent mispricings. 3 However, the second ingredient, limits of arbitrage, deter informed traders from eliminating this situation (cf. Black, 1986 , or more formally, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) since it is a priori unclear how long buying or selling pressure from overly optimistic or pessimistic noise traders will persist. However, every mispricing must eventually be corrected so that one should observe that high levels of investor optimism are on average followed by low returns and vice versa.
Earlier evidence (e.g. Brown and Cliff, 2006) do indeed show that there is a negative sentiment-return relation on the aggregate U.S. stock market level. We investigate this relation for an international set of markets which leads to our first hypothesis: Therefore, one may expect that stock markets in collectivistic countries are more heavily influenced by investor sentiment whereas stock markets in individualistic, in which people tend to put more weight on their own information and opinion, should be less affected by these behavioral biases.
Finally, there is an extensive literature investigating how market quality affects market outcome (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) . Therefore, we also check whether institutional quality of a country explains the cross-section of the sentiment-return relation. This results in our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3:
The impact of sentiment on returns is stronger for countries that have less well developed market institutions and for countries that are culturally more prone to investor overreaction.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

General data considerations
As previously noted, we are interested in measuring the effect of noise trader demand shocks on stock markets. Doing this in a consistent way is exacerbated by the fact that there is no consensus on what kind of proxies to employ when measuring individual sentiment for a single country. This problem naturally aggravates when attempting to find a proxy that is available for different countries.
However, given the recent detailed analysis of consumer confidence as a proxy for investor sentiment by Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) it seems natural to use this metric for an international analysis. First of all, consumer confidence is available for several industrialized countries and, secondly, it is available for reasonable periods of time. Third, consumer confidence, albeit measured slightly different in various countries, seems to be the only consistent way to obtain a sentiment proxy that is largely comparable across countries and that is not calculated from trading data itself.
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Therefore, we use data on stock returns and consumer confidence for 18 industrialized countries to investigate the international sentiment-return relation. Our sample of countries is largely dictated by data availability but consumer confidence is available for several countries on horizons of up to 20 years. We include the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand and 14
European countries (see Table 1 for a complete list of countries). These markets cover the lion's share of international stock market capitalization, cover the most liquid markets in the 6 A short overview of alternative sentiment measures and further evidence on consumer confidence as a proxy for investor sentiment can be found in Appendix 1.
world -namely the U.S., Europe and Japan -and thus provide a representative sample. Some details on international consumer confidence indices can be found in Appendix 2. Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006) .
Finally, the consumer confidence index for Japan is available on a quarterly frequency only.
We convert it to a monthly frequency by using the last available values for months without data as in Baker and Wurgler (2006) . periods for several countries. However, we have a minimum of 120 monthly observations even for the most data-constrained country Austria.
As can be seen, value stocks have higher mean returns than growth stocks for most countries, a fact documented before in a voluminous literature on the value premium (Fama and French, 1998) . The descriptive statistics for the consumer confidence indices show a high degree of serial correlation in the time-series. First order autocorrelations (ρ -1 ) are high and uniformly above 90%. We will take special care of the serial correlation in our empirical analyses.
Some preliminary tests
Given these large autocorrelations it appears interesting to test whether our consumer confidence indices are unit-root non-stationary. We present panel unit-root tests in Table 2 that (a) test for a common unit root (Levin, Lin, and Chu, 2002) or (b) for individual unitroots in the 18 consumer confidence series. Results shown in Table 2 are comforting and suggest that we indeed deal with stationary, but highly persistent, time-series processes.
It is also reassuring, that correlation coefficients of the consumer confidence indices (not reported here for the sake of brevity) are not prohibitively strong, i.e. we are not using essentially one sentiment series for all countries. More precisely, cross-country correlation coefficients range from -0.47 to 0.88. Consequently, there are several countries that show a large correlation (e.g. Austria and Germany), essentially no correlation (e.g. Australia and Switzerland) or a negative correlation (e.g. Sweden and Japan). These results hold for both levels and changes of consumer confidence series.
Finally, we take a look at Granger-Causality tests as a simple device to check for timeseries dependencies between our sentiment measures and stock returns. Results for simple bivariate (stock returns and consumer confidence) Granger-Causality tests and Block exogeneity tests are shown in Table 3 . 9 As can be inferred, there is two-way "causality" such that sentiment depends on previous returns and that returns depend on previous sentiment movements. 10 How can these findings be interpreted? As Qiu and Welch (2005) point out, sentiment should be related to some variable, e.g. returns, macro variables, etc. This just follows from the fact that sentiment "should not fall like manna from heaven" (Qiu and Welch, 2005, p. 23) . Rather investors are overly optimistic or pessimistic due to a series of good or bad news, returns, or macro developments. Therefore, the result that returns drive sentiment and that sentiment drives subsequent returns, seems very reasonable. Also, the causality running from sentiment to returns may be seen as a first confirmation of hypotheses 1 and 2.
Predictive Regressions of Stock Returns on Consumer Confidence
This section presents results on the sentiment-return relation. We will first introduce the econometric methodology in section 4.1, present results from panel regressions in section 4.2, discuss findings for individual countries in section 4.3, and relate our findings for international markets to earlier studies in section 4.4.
Methodology
In order to test for sentiment effects on future returns, we estimate long-horizon return regressions of the form
Tests for block exogeneity are based on VARs that include several control variables, such as dividend yields, CPI inflation, industrial production, detrended short rates and term spreads. Estimation of the underlying VARs is done by pooling data of all countries in the sample. Each country has its own vector of constants while slope coefficients are restricted to be equal across countries. 10 It should be noted, that Brown and Cliff (2004) also test for Granger-Causality between sentiment and returns. They find that causality runs from small and large stock returns to sentiment and that sentiment impacts returns of small but not of large stocks.
with the average k-period return 11 for country i as dependent variable and several predictors on the right-hand side. These predictors include consumer confidence as a proxy for individual sentiment (sent) and additional macro variables which are collected in matrix Ψ.
Specifically, we include annual CPI inflation, the annual percentage change in industrial production, the term spread, the dividend yield, and the detrended (6 months) short rate in Ψ to net out effects of commonly employed risk factors on returns.
12 As usual, we employ known up-to-week t information to forecast mean excess returns beginning in month t+1
only. Furthermore, to facilitate comparisons of the sentiment-return relation between countries we standardize all right-hand side variables used in (2).
Based on the general predictive regression in (2), we will pursue two different approaches. First, we estimate panel fixed-effects regressions, so that all countries enter the regressions jointly. The cross-sectional fixed-effects specification allows individual countries to have different regression constants. We use panel regressions to increase the power of our tests and to investigate whether there is a significant sentiment-return relation on average across countries. This approach translates into
so that there is a country-specific intercept. However, slope coefficients are restricted to be equal across countries.
Second, we estimate (2) separately for each of the 18 countries in our sample and test for a significant impact of sentiment on future returns across horizons. More specifically, we jointly estimate equation (2) Finally, we have to deal with some technical problems arising in predictive regressions of the form employed here. These problems stem from persistent predictive variables (Stambaugh, 1999) and from employing overlapping observations. We use a moving block-bootstrap simulation procedure to overcome these problems. Details on the simulation can be found in Appendix 3.
Results for panel regressions
We start with the results for fixed-effects panel regressions which are shown in Table   4 . The three Panels of this table provide results for the aggregate market (Panel A), value stocks (Panel B), and growth stocks (Panel C). The coefficients reported directly show the impact of a two standard deviation shock (i.e. a "large shock") of sentiment on returns.
Looking at Panel A first, it can be seen that investor sentiment has a significantly negative impact on future stock returns at all forecast horizons (1 to 24 months) although significance is limited to the 6% level at the longest horizon. Overall, the result of a significantly negative relation between sentiment and returns is in line with theoretical considerations of the impact of noise traders and earlier empirical findings for the U.S. and our first hypothesis.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the impact of sentiment on average future returns declines with the forecast horizon. This finding has both a statistical and an economic implication. First, it is often argued that long-horizon regressions with nearly integrated regressors spuriously generate significant results at increasing horizons (cf. Hong et al. (2007) , p. 17 for a discussion). If there was a bias in our results not eliminated by the bootstrapping procedure that mechanically generated significant results over longer horizons, one would expect to see exactly such a result. Yet, this is not the case here. Second, in economic terms, the diminishing marginal impact suggests that noise trading effects do indeed wash out over longer time periods, i.e. there are limits to arbitrage in the short to medium run but these limits to arbitrage become weaker at longer horizons. This result seems reasonable from a theoretical viewpoint since the opposite finding would mean that noise trader demand shocks move markets permanently away from equilibrium.
Results are also significant in economic terms. A two standard deviation rise in the sentiment proxy depresses stock returns by 0.40% on average over the next month and, although the average monthly effect declines with the forecast horizon, has a negative impact of almost 5% over the following two years (-0.20 × 24 months). Looking at the adjusted R 2 s and incremental adjusted R 2 s (i.e. the rise in adj. R 2 s when additionally including the sentiment factor in the predictive regression) reveals that sentiment adds quite some explanatory power relative to the other predictor variables, especially at short and intermediate horizons. For example, at the one month horizon, sentiment accounts for all of the explained variance (although the R 2 is small which is typical for stock return forecasts).
Panels B and C of Table 4 show results for value and growth stocks. Findings are qualitatively similar to those for aggregate market returns, but the effects for value stocks are much more pronounced than for aggregate markets or growth stocks. For example, a one standard deviation shock in consumer confidence leads to a decrease in average expected returns of more than 0.5% p.m. over a six months horizon for value stocks (Table 4, Panel B) whereas aggregate market returns and growth stocks decline by only 0.3% p.m. on average.
Therefore, hypothesis 2 receives some support in general but the results suggest that value stocks are more heavily influenced than growth stocks.
Results for individual countries
Results for the predictive power of sentiment in individual countries are presented in Table 5 , Panels A to C. The Table reports the average predictive coefficient of sentiment over forecast horizons of 1, 6, 12, and 24 months and the p-value of a test that all forecast coefficients are zero.
As can be seen from Panel A, which provides results for aggregate market returns, there is quite some heterogeneity across countries. All in all, a significant sentiment-return relation is found for 9 countries on a 5%-level of significance and for 11 countries on a 10%-level only, which roughly equals 50% of countries in our sample. Therefore, sentiment effects on returns seem to be country-specific and hypothesis 1 is not supported for all countries in our sample. A similar finding holds for value and growth stocks -shown in Panels B and Cwhich also document that there is heterogeneity across countries. However, corroborating the evidence above, the sentiment-return relation seems somewhat stronger for value stocks than for growth stocks (and the aggregate market) as there are more countries with a significantly negative impact of sentiment on future returns. 13 Therefore, hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted in general but receives more support for value stocks and less support for growth stocks.
Looking at the effects across countries, there is an especially strong relation between sentiment and future returns in countries such as Japan, Italy, or Germany, while there is little to no evidence for such effects in countries like Australia, New Zealand, or the U.K. Also, the U.S. cannot be seen as a country that is particularly prone to sentiment effects. The average coefficient estimate across forecasting horizons is only -0.12 and thus well below average.
Several other European countries (e.g. Italy, Germany, or France) as well as Japan show a much larger impact of sentiment on returns.
In a nutshell, evidence does not seem to be obviously related to geographical locations or the size of a country.
Relation of our results to earlier studies
This section relates our findings to effects documented in the earlier literature.
However, while most of earlier studies deal exclusively with the U.S., some caution is warranted when comparing these results with our findings for international stock markets.
First, the paper by Brown and Cliff (2005) provides some direct benchmark, since they provide results for the aggregate stock market, value, and growth stocks separately.
Looking at their results (Table 6 , p. 422) for the aggregate market, they find that a two standard deviation movement in their sentiment measure leads to declining returns of about 1.76% for a 6-months horizon, and -5.8% for a 12-months horizon. These numbers are similar to our panel estimates of about -1.86% and -5.4% for the same horizons and thus seem to be of reasonable size. Baker and Wurgler in that we find a significant effect of sentiment on both groups of stocks and in line with Lemmon and Portniaguina since the effect is stronger for value stocks.
However, our results differ in that there is a significant effect for growth stocks (different from Lemmon and Portniaguina) and that the effects are economically much stronger for value stocks (different from Baker and Wurgler). Therefore, our international results do not exclusively support any of the earlier findings in the U.S. literature. The differing results are likely to stem from the fact that we are using consumer confidence as a proxy for investor sentiment whereas earlier papers use a variety of different sentiment proxies and sample periods. Therefore, since U.S. results themselves are not fully consistent with each other, it is obvious that our results cannot be consistent with each of the earlier findings. Apart from this, our results suggest that earlier U.S. findings on cross-sectional effects cannot easily be generalized to international markets.
However, our individual results for the U.S. (from Table 5 ), are consistent with findings from Lemmon and Portniaguina who also find that sentiment significantly affects value stocks but not growth stocks. This result seems comforting since we are using the same proxy for investor sentiment as these authors. 
Robustness tests
Many earlier papers on sentiment and stock returns have also looked at sentiment and the returns to small and large stocks. While we are primarily interested in the effect of sentiment on international aggregate stock markets, we also present some robustness checks with small and large stocks.
We employ the same methodology and control variables as documented above, but use small stocks, large stocks, and the size premium (small minus large stocks) as dependent Results from this robustness exercise are presented graphically in Figure 1 , where we plot the estimated impact of a two standard deviation shock of sentiment (left) and expected business conditions (right) on subsequent returns for forecast horizons of one to 24 months.
Results are shown for the aggregate market (Panel A), value (Panel B), and growth stocks (Panel C). As can be seen, consumer confidence remains a statistically and economically significant predictor of returns across our sample countries whereas expected business conditions show no significant forecasting power and also tend to have a positive rather than a negative impact on future returns. Therefore, it seems unlikely that consumer confidence is just a simple business cycle proxy which is not driven to insignificance by the other control 16 We employ the most common business sentiment indicator in each country, e.g. the ISM Index for the U.S., the CBI index for the U.K., or the IFO Index for Germany. Panel unit-root tests indicate that these indices are stationary. More detailed descriptive statistics are available upon request.
variables. 17 This result also strengthens the empirical support for hypothesis 1, namely that sentiment has an impact on future returns even after controlling for other fundamental factors.
Finally, we look at the correlation of unexpected returns and sentiment innovations as suggested by Pastor and Stambaugh (2008) . The idea in the sentiment-return context here is that in a predictive regression of the form
r s e n t where consumer confidence is informative about discount factors.
We report the correlation of i t ξ with i t η for all countries i in Table 7 . It is obvious that the typical correlation of unexpected returns with sentiment shocks is positive. Furthermore, countries that show a significant relation between returns and sentiment tend to have higher correlation coefficients of the two shocks. This is in line with the story that irrational noise trader sentiment drives price away from fundamentally warranted levels.
Cross-Sectional Analysis
Possible Determinants of Cross-Sectional Variation in the Sentiment-Return Relationship
In this section we discuss possible explanatory variables for the cross-sectional analysis of the sentiment-return relation for our 18 countries. We start by identifying behavioral factors based on the analysis by Chui, Titman and Wei (2008) and then move on to some often used proxies for market efficiency that might drive cross-country results.
Behavioral factors
The behavioral explanation of the sentiment-return relation says that individuals herd and overreact. Therefore, our findings could be explained by systematic cross-country differences in herd-like overreaction. As noted in the introduction, Chui, Titman and Wei (2008) suggest that differences in collectivistic behavior might be a driver of the tendency of investors to herd. Therefore, we employ a measure of collectivism constructed by Hofstede short-run return reversals after waves of correlated behavior. Therefore, any empirical test of the behavioral story must take into account both dimensions, herding and overreaction.
We employ a second index by Hofstede to capture the likely degree of overreaction across countries. The uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) measures the degree to which a culture programs its members to react to unusual and novel situations. While this is not directly addressed in our analysis here, Hofstede documents that people in more uncertainty avoiding countries act and react more emotional compared to countries with low levels of uncertainty avoidance. People in the latter countries act more contemplative and thoughtful.
Therefore, we employ the uncertainty avoidance index as a rough proxy for the tendency of individuals to overreact. Furthermore, it is known that UAI is correlated with the collectivism index since the UAI also captures cross-country differences in the tendency of people to follow the same sets of rules and thus behave in the same manner. This is correlated with collectivism and in our sample the correlation between collectivism and uncertainty avoidance indeed is about 0.50. Therefore, higher levels of the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) should indicate both a tendency towards more overreaction-like behavior and herd behavior.
Market integrity
As a second set of explanatory variables we use proxies for what Chui, Titman and
Wei (2008) call "stock market integrity". The idea behind these variables is that markets with higher institutional quality should have a more developed flow of information and are consequently more efficient. In order to allow for a direct comparison with Chui, Titman and Wei we include the same variables as in their study.
The market integrity variables include a dummy for the legal origin of a country (the dummy equals one when a country is common law and zero for civil law), the index of antidirector rights, the corruption perception index and accounting standards. These variables are taken from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) . Additionally, we follow Chui, Titman and Wei and include the risk of earnings management index. 
Results
To investigate the potential determinants of the cross-sectional variation in sentimentreturn relation we pool countries according to high or low values of the above discussed determinants and run panel fixed-effects regressions on the resulting subset of countries. For example, we split the group of all countries into a subset that has collectivism values above the median and a subset with below-median collectivism values. The panel predictive regression in (3) is then estimated separately for these two groups of countries. We can then compare the effect of sentiment on returns to see whether higher collectivism indeed results in stronger sentiment effects. We repeat this procedure for all possible determinants discussed above.
We focus on a twelve months forecast horizon to capture longer-term effects. While results reported below are very similar for other forecasting horizons, we focus on this longer horizon to capture persistent effects of sentiment and not some short-lived effects only.
Results are shown in Table 8 and reveal some interesting results. First, looking at the behavioral factors of Chui, Titman, and Wei, we find that collectivistic countries and countries with a high uncertainty avoidance index show larger effects of sentiment on returns than individualistic and low UAI countries. Indeed, significant effects are obtained for the former groups of countries only and the incremental adj. R 2 are significantly higher than for the latter groups of countries.
We furthermore form a composite index of the behavioral factors by principal components analysis which we use to combine the information contained in the two variables.
The first principal component explains about 76% of the total variance. Results for this combined behavioral factor ("PC culture") also show that countries with a cultural tendency for herding and overreaction are subject to a much stronger sentiment-return relation.
Therefore, Chui, Titman, and Wei's hypothesis, that collectivism boosts herd-like overreaction (hypothesis 3 in our paper), can be confirmed empirically.
We next turn to the market integrity factors. 20 The general picture here is that higher market integrity weakens the sentiment-return relation which seems intuitively reasonable and which is also in line with our third hypothesis. This effect is visible both in the statistical and economic significance of the estimated sentiment coefficients and in the incremental adj. R 2 s.
Again we use principal component analysis to combine the integrity factors. 21 We show results for the first principal component ("PC market integrity") and find that this general integrity factor significantly discriminates between countries with high and low sentiment effects. Also, the effect of market integrity seems somewhat stronger than that for the behavioral factors. Table 8 but additionally allow for significance tests of dummy variables or interaction terms which are indicative of whether culture or market integrity significantly affect the sentiment-return relation across countries. The general finding across specifications (i.e. with and without control variables, with one or both principal components included, and for different forecast horizons) is, that differences between the groups of countries shown in Table 8 are significant for both the culture and the market integrity variables. There is, however, no clear pattern that would indicate dominance of one of the two sets of variables, i.e. there is no clear evidence that culture is more important than market integrity or vice versa. 20 In order to make results easier to read in interpret, we have rescaled all market integrity factors such that higher values indicate higher market integrity. 21 The first principal component explains about 65% of the total variance. 22 Results are not included to conserve space but are available upon request.
Conclusions
We investigate the relation between investor sentiment and future stock returns for 18 industrialized countries and find that sentiment is a significant predictor of expected returns on average across countries. The predictive power of sentiment is most pronounced for short and medium-term horizons of one to six months and washes out over longer horizons of 12 to 24 months. However, the predictive power of sentiment varies across countries and we find in individual country regressions, that sentiment does not contain predictive power for several countries at all.
In order to investigate this issue, we look at possible determinants of the strength of the relation between sentiment and returns and find that the influence of noise traders on markets varies cross-sectionally in a way that is economically intuitive. The impact of sentiment on returns is higher for countries that are culturally more prone to herd-like investment behavior as hypothesized by Chui, Titman and Wei (2008) and for countries that have less efficient regulatory institutions or less market integrity.
Therefore, one cannot simply transfer evidence from the U.S. to other markets and presume that irrational noise traders move stock markets in general. Rather than that, institutional quality and cultural factors are strong determinants of the sentiment-return relation. Regarding possible policy implications, high quality market institutions seem desirable to alleviate effects of noise trading. Culture, however, does not seem to be easily changeable so that sentiment effects should be a persistent phenomenon in countries with a herding culture.
Appendix 1. Different proxies for investor sentiment
A natural question that arises when attempting to quantify the influence of sentiment on stock returns is how to measure (unobserved) sentiment. Existing studies have used different proxies, of which closed-end fund discounts are one major vehicle (c.f. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991 , Swaminathan, 1996 , or Neal and Wheatley, 1998 responds to the tone and volume of economics news reports while being hardly affected by the content of news. All these findings make consumer confidence seem to be a reasonable proxy for individual sentiment and we follow these findings by using measures of consumer confidence as a sentiment proxy throughout the paper.
Appendix 2. Some details on consumer confidence surveys in different countries
This Appendix provides some details on how consumer confidence surveys are carried out in our different sample countries. The main objective of this appendix is to highlight similarities and possible differences across countries.
There is an internationally standardized set of questions for surveying consumer confidence which is close to the questions asked by the Survey of the University of Michigan.
Most surveys in developed countries (and all surveys in our sample countries) make use of these standardized questions to ensure international comparability. More specifically, these questions ask about the past and future financial situation of the household, the past and future economic situation more generally, and about major purchases of durable goods. While these questions are core, most surveys ask additional questions which are often similar across countries. For example, various surveys (e.g. the surveys of the European Commission and the polls in Switzerland) ask for the expected employment situation over the next year and CPI developments, and some surveys additionally ask for longer-term expectations (e.g. 5 year forecasts in Australia). 23 However, given that core questions are extremely similar across developed countries, one might expect that consumer confidence indices are comparable internationally.
While there do not seem to be economically interesting differences between survey questions, maybe the clearest difference between countries occurs with respect to seasonal adjustments. Although most countries do seasonally adjust (Switzerland is an exception), they do not use the same procedures. For example, Japan uses "X-11" whereas the European commission employs "Dainties". Whether employment of these different procedures may affect econometric estimates quantitatively, there is little evidence in our results that it matters qualitatively. Significant impacts of consumer confidence on returns can be found in countries like Switzerland (no seasonal adjustments), Japan (X-11), and Germany (Dainties), but not in e.g. Ireland (which is also adjusted by Dainties).
Another difference between surveys worth mentioning are the questions about future developments. While most surveys (e.g. the European surveys) mainly ask for one year horizons, there are exceptions such as the Michigan survey which asks for one year horizons regarding a household's financial situation but for 5 year horizons regarding economic developments. Therefore, forecast horizons differ somewhat between countries.
Finally, consumer confidence surveys in different countries naturally differ by the number of participants. While most surveys are based on more than 1,000 households, there are large differences between smaller countries (e.g. Switzerland with 1,100 participants) and large countries (e.g. France with 3,300 participants, Japan with more than 5,000 participants, and obvious outliers such as the Michigan survey in the U.S. which is based on 500 respondents, only. 
